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CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE LATE DEFICIENCY
JUDGMENT ACTS
FREDERICK C. FIECHTER, JR.*
Recent decisions of our Supreme and Superior Courts' holding unconstitutional the Deficiency Judgment Acts have raised anew in Pennsylvania the
century-old question, peculiar to our unique American doctrine of judicial review, 2 regarding the effect of an unconstitutional statute, or rather, the effect
3
of a decision holding a statute unconstitutional.
How important the question is may be gathered by the fact that between
January 17, 1934 and October 5, 1936 over 35,000 mortgages were foreclosed in
Philadelphia alone. Seven or more cases reached the Supreme Court of the state.
For almost two hundred and thirty years 4 Pennsylvania law gave a mortgagee
the right to foreclose against the real property covered by the mortgage and to
sooner or later5 recover the difference between the price he received on the
sale of the real property (a price conclusive as to its value) and what the mortgagor
had promised to pay under his bond. He might proceed by execution against per-*
sonaf or other real property to satisfy the deficiency judgment.
The Act of Jan. 17, 1934, P.L. 243 entitled"An act to protect the owners of mortgaged property during the
present emergency by limiting the amount of deficiency judgments
during a certain period."*A.B. 1932, Harvard University; LL.B., 1935, Univ. of Penn.; Member of the Philadelphia Bar.
iBeaver County B. & L. Assn. v. Winowich, decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
October 5, 1936; Shallcross et al. Receivers v. North Branch-Sedgwick B. & L. Assn., decided by
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, November 13th, 1936.
2
Attacks on this power are older than the New Deal. In 1809 a Judge of the Supreme Court
of Ohio barely missed impeachment for finding an act unconstitutional,-Salmon P. Chase, "Preliminary Sketch of the History of Ohio" in the Preface to his collection of the Statutes of Ohio
i788-1883, pages 38-40. See also Von Moschzisker, "Pending Attacks on Power of Courts to Review
the Constitutionality of Legislation," an address delivered in 1924 contained in his Judicial Review
of Legislation.
SThe same problem exists to some extent in Arizona, Arkansas, California, New Jersey,
Georgia and Texas, but, so far as the writer could ascertain, no cases have been reported sllowing
the effect of the holdings declaring their Deficiency Judgment Acts unconstitutional.
4January 12, 1705, 36 Sm. L. 59.
sStay laws have been passed at various times in Pennsylvania. They are enumerated in a note
to the majority opinion in the Beaver County casq,.supra,
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altered this remedy by providing"That whenever any real property is sold6 on any execution on the
foreclosure of any mortgage, or on a judgment entered on any ob,,gation secured by mortgage, and the sum for which such property was
sold is not sufficient to satisfy the debt, interest and costs, the plaintiff or use-plaintiff shall, within six months after such sale, petition
the court out of which such writ of execution issued to fix the fair
value of the property sold . . . . Such petition shall be heard by a
judge of such court sitting without a jury, or may . . . . be referred
to a master for hearing and determination, subject to confirmation
by the court ...
"At all such hearings any party in interest may introduce in evidence testimony of the fair value of the premises sold at the time
of the sale. In the event that the fair value so determined is greater
than the price for which the property was sold, the amount of such
fair value shall be deducted from the amount of the judgment, interest and costs, and a deficiency judgment entered for the balance.
"If the plaintiff or use-plaintiff shall fail to present such petition
within six months after such sale, the prothonotary shall, upon application of the defendant or other party in interest, enter satisfaction
of such judgment. Such satisfaction shall have the effect of terminating as well the liability of all persons bound by any obligation securing
the payment of such mortgage debt.
"The act makes provision, for notice of the presentation of the
petition, and also provides for a jury trial to determine the fair value
if either party so desires. By its terms it was to become effective im7
mediately upon its enactment and remain in force until July 1, 1935."
The Act of July 1, 1935, P.L. 503 was a continuation and revision of the
1934 Act placing still greater restrictions upon the recovery of a mortgage indebtedness.
Violation of provisions in the state and federal constitutions against impairing the obligation of contracts was the basis of the holdings. It is the writer's
hesitant opinion, however, that the acts will be considered unconstitutional even
where the mortgage agreement was executed after the passage of the act, thus

$The act applied only to cases where the property was exposed to sale after January 17, 1934.
St. Charles B. & L. Ass'n. v. Hamilton, 319 Pa. 220 (1936).

MErposition of act contained in majority opinion of the Beaver County case, supra.
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The problems fall naturally into two divisions, those concerning mortgages
executed before the passage of the Act9 and those concerning mortgages executed
after the passage of the Act.5 0 But before going into the ramifications of the
mortgage problem a view of the effect of a declaration of unconstitutionality
in other situations may be helpful. The immediate reaction of most lawyers is
best expressed by Judge Cooley who said:
"When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional it is as if
it has never been. Rights cannot be built up under it; contracts
which depend upon it for their consideration are void; it constitutes

a protection to no one who has acted under it, and no one can be

punished for having refused obedience to it before the decision was
made."'" (Italics supplied).
Although the traditional doctrine of American courts as to the effect of declaring
an act unconstitutional, a study of the cases indicate that this metaphysical conception is less than half correct. The pioneering student of the subject is Professor
SWhile it is true the Court said: "Whatever validity the Mortgage Deficiency Judgment Act
of 1934 may have as to mortgages executed after its passage, it is violative . . . of . . . Constitu.
tions . . . in the present case," the plaintiff contended the Act violated Article III, sec. 7 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution providing against local or special legislation impairing liens or changing
the methods of-collecting debts. He also contended that the Act violated Article Ill, Sec. 3 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution requiring the subject of an Act to be clearly expressed in its title.
Furthermore, the Act of 1934 contains no statement that it applies where a mortgage "has been
given" to secure a debt before the effective date of the Act. Instead of upholding the act by interpreting it as not applying to such obligations---as did the California Court--our Court construed
the Act as intended to apply to obligations entered into before its passage, thus making it unconstitutional.
The Act of 1935 (Sec. 11) attempts to continue the 1934 Act; however, by virtue of its
severability provision insuring constitutionality of the remainder if part of the act falls, Sec. 11
would not be fatal. Section 1 of the 1935 Act specifically covers a mortgage which "is or has
been given." This alone is ground for arguing that since an integral section of an act cannot
he winnowed, and since part of this section is unconstitutional the whole section and the whole
act must fall. On the other hand, it is plausible to contend that Sec. I as well as Sec. 11 may be
stricken and the remainder of the act will be effective.
9The word "Act" is used to indicate both the 1934 and the 1935 Acts.
lOUnder the view taken here it makes no difference whether or not the 1935 act is construed
as having its effective date go back to the date of the 1934 enactment.
I'Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.) p. 259. To the same effect, see Norton v. Shelby
County 118 U. S. 425, 6 Supreme Ct. Reporter 1126, 30 Lawyer's Ed. 178, 1886. See also
6 Ruling Case Law, Section 117, and 118 where it is said"Protection of Rights under Unconstitutional Laws. The general rule is that an unconstitutional
act of the legislature protects no one. It is said that all persons are presumed to know the law, meaning that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Consequently, if any person acts under an unconstitutional statute, the general rule is that he does so at his peril, and must take the consequences."
See also 12 Corpus Juris Sec. 228; 53 A.L.R. 269.
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Oliver Peter Field whose book 12 is an exhaustive authority on the pertinent
general law.
Actually there are several views as to the effect of an unconstitutional statute
held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, just to illustrate with one court. The
difficulty comes in trying to ascertain which view the Court will apply to a patticular situation.
Most enunciated by the horn books is the void ab inihio theory which eliminates the statute from the consideration of a case both as law and as a fact. Enactment by the legislature and reliance on it by the people are immaterial.
This cuts some hard knots principally in the case of criminal convictions under
statutes subsequently declared unconstitutional. Habeas corpus is always available to help the convict in this situation. Also, where one act attempts to repeal
another, and the repealing act is held unconstitutional, it is said the reason for
not having to reenact the first statute is that the repealer was void ab initio. The
same is true in the case of an unconstitutional amendment to a valid statute.
Another view is that the statute should be given sufficient effect to constitute
one of the facts in the case. Its validity is presumed because parties were led to assume its validity and were warranted in their assumption. This view is the
raison d etre of the majority of the Pennsylvania cases. The de facto doctrine and
that of mistake of law and estoppel are used to support this view to a greater or
less extent according to how willing the court is to admit that an unconstitutional statute has some legal effect. Generally the court tries to find an "out" to
avoid making this concession. Thus where viewers in an eminent domain proceeding were appointed under an act later declared unconstitutional, it was held
that the defendant could not take advantage of their lack of jurisdiction because
he had already appealed their assessment to the Common Pleas and his objection
to the viewers' jurisdiction was too late. 13 In the case of taxes paid under unconstitutional acts some courts have paid lip service to the void ab initio theory by allowing recovery where taxes were paid under coercion, t 4 and there we incline to
the presumption of validity theory. Where a borough tax, part of which was legal
and part illegal, was paid by the person assessed, without protest or notice that he
would reclaim the part illegally assessed, the Court held he could not recover,
saying-

12"The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute," Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1935. See review by
T. R. Powell, 48 Harv. L.R. 1271-3,, May, 193.5; H. E. Willis, 83 Univ. of Pa. 1042-3, June, 1935.
The first, results of Field's study are contained in I Indiana Law Journal, 1926.
13Wilson v. City of Scranton, 141 Pa. 621, (1891).
l'Protest with notice that if party is not liable, h'e will seek recovery, is not coercion in -case
of assessments paid for streets.

DICKINSON LAV REVIEW

"The case is very different from that of payment to an individual
by mistake. It was submission to legitimate authority which was
It is a contribution
.
prima facie right in its exercise....
to a common fund in the benefits of which he, as a citizen or property-holder, participates. It, is intended for immediate expenditure
for the common good, and it would be unjust to require its repayment, after it has been thus, in whole or in part, properly expended,
which would often be the case if suit could be brought for its recovery without notice having been given at the time of payment and
there would be no bar against its insidious spring but the statute
of limitations'5."
The de facto doctrine is best exemplified in Pennsylvania in decisions dealing
with acts creating public offices. Thus the court refuses to allow the office of a
judge 16 or that of an assistant district attorney 17 to be questioned by one already
affected by their acts. But if quo warranto issues, and the statute creating the
office held by defendant is unconstitutional, ouster will be granted.'s
Nor will de faato officers be held civilly or criminally liable for official acts
performed before the statute creating their office is declared unconstitutional.' 9
20
Similarly, private individuals acting for them will not be-held liable.
Municipal improvement cases show how unworkable the void ab initio theory
may be. Acts performed by municipal officers in opening a street for gas pipes,
to take a common example, are not rendered invalid when the statute under which
they were done is declared "void." In one case2 l a taxpayer brought a bill to
restrain the maintenance of gas pipes after he had paid an assessment for having
them laid. Our Court treated the matter as follows:22
"It is now objected against the legality of the defendant in laying
its pipes, that the city government had no power to proceed in the
opening of this street, because the act of 1887 was unconstitutional
in certain respects. However this contention might suffice to prevent
the city from laying out and opening streets in the future, it does not
5

1 Peebles v. City of Pittsburgh, 101 Pa. 304 (1882). Borough of Allentown v. Saeger, 2b
Pa. 421 (1853). Similarly, Robert Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Pa. 73 (1855).
lECoyle v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. 117 (1883).
7
' Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. 436 (1867).
8
' Commonwealth ex. rel. Hite v. Swank, 79 Pa. 154 (1875). Here the office of clerk of
court was questioned, but not by one who thus sought to avoid acts already performed by the clerk.
19Clark v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. 129 (1858); Campbell et al. v. Commonwealth, 96 Pa. 344
(.1880); and especially Dunn v. Mellon et al.. 147 Pa. 11 (1892).
20
Dunn v. Mellon, supra.
21King v. Philadelphia, 154 Pa. 160 (1893).
221bid. pages 167, 168, 170.
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follow by any means that it will suffice to overthrow such work previously done under color of authority conferred by the act . . . . The
opening of a street ordinarily is followed by the erection of buildings
on both sides, by the laying of gas and water pipes, and the construction of sewers. If after all this has taken place, it is discovered, and
judicially decided, that the law under which the municipal authorities have acted in the premises, is unconstitutional, surely it cannot be
said that all the improvements, works, and buildings, carried on and
constructed under apparent legal authority, must be abandoned or
destroyed. ..
..
"We do not consider that any question of estoppel arises against
the plaintiff by reason of the payment by him of assessed benefits.
We decide the case upon the ground that there was a compliance with
the existing law in the laying of the pipes, and that the defendant is
not responsible for the law of 1887, or its want of conformity to the
constitution." (Italics supplied).
Here there is a moral obligation to preserve the status quo, and since it will
cost nothing, it is carried out. But where a county undertook to pay mink bounties
and the act was held unconstitutional, accrued bounties were not paid 23
As we should expect, the presumption of validity theory is also applied where
the court first holds an act constitutional, and then holds it unconstitutional, to
2
rights acquired in reliance upon the first decision. 4
An important doctrine in Pennsylvania in support of this theory is that of
estoppel. It is a less exacting doctrine, be it remarked, than the classical estoppel
by misrepresentation found in other branches of the law. Under our doctrine a shareholder is estopped from defending against an action by a receiver to collect an
assessment, merely by showing that the statute under which an organization took
28
place was invalid.
The most important Pennsylvania case on this kind of estoppel is Bidwell
s'. City of Pittsburgh. 28 In that case Bidwell was active in procuring an ordinance
for the grading and paving of streets, was charged with the superintendence of the
improvement and sold bonds to defray its cost. When the time came to pay the
assessment on his own land, he attempted to avoid payment on the ground that the
law authorizing the improvement was unconstitutional. The Court held that Bidwell's conduct made him liable, saying inter alia,
2STeeple v. Wayne County, 23 C.C. 361 (1900).
24
Dictum in Ray v. Natural Gas Co., 138 Pa. 576 (1890).
26Freeland v. Pa. Central Insurance Co.. 94 Pa. 504 (1880); Commonwealth v. County of
Philadelphia, 193 Pa. 236, 44 Atd. 336 (1899).
2685 Pa. 412 (1877).
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"In Pickard v. Sears, 6 Ad. & El. 469, a leading case of estoppel
by conduct, it was said 'the rule of law is clear that where one by his
words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe in the existence
of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief,
so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from
averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the
same time.'
"Itmay now be declared as a general rule, that where an act is
done, or a statement made by a party, the truth or efficacy of which
it would be a fraud on his part to controvert or impair, the character
of an estoppel shall be given to what otherwise would be a mere evidence. It is not necessary that the party against whom an estoppel is
alleged, should have intended to deceive: it is sufficient if he intended
that his conduct should induce another to act upon it, and the other
relying on it, did so act: Bisp. Eq., Sec. 290.27
'. ..... "It is true every one is presumed to know the law, and
knowledge thereof is said to be equally open to all. Conceding that
the city had knowledge of the law, or ought to have had it, the like
legal presumption applies to the plaintiff in error, and his equities
derive no strength from that presumption. The city had no reason
to believe that he would allege any invalidity in the law which he
was praying to have extended over him. The city was misled, not by
expressive silence merely of the plaintiff in error, but by his decided
and persistent action. It has been held that where a party has acted
upon a particular construction of a contract which has been acquiesced
in by the other, the latter is estopped from contesting it as the proper
construction: Mercer Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. McKee, 17
P. F. Smith 1 7 0 ."2s
Finally, there is the view which refuses to take an attitude and which makes
a statute constitutional in some circumstances and unconstitutional in other circumstances. Professor Field calls it the case-to-case theory and points the appellation by a quotation from the United States Supreme Court: "a statute may be
invalid as applied to one state of facts and valid as applied to another."29 This
is a type of partial unconstitutionality and will be relevant to our discussion only
to the extent we speculate concerning the validity of the Deficiency Judgment Act
as to mortgages executed after its passage.
27lbid., p. 417.
aSlbid., p: 418.
29Dahnke-Walker Milling Company v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 42 Sup. Ct. 106, 66 L. Ed.
239 (1921).
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So much for the bare outlines of the Pennsylvania law on the subject in general. They are only sufficient to illustrate the fact that there is no invariable meaning to the words "declared the act unconstitutional." Because the hardship occasioned by reliance on the supposed (and frequently judicially expounded) 30
validity of a statute, subsequently declared unconstitutional, offends our sense
of justice, Pennsylvania courts among others have not consistently adhered to a
policy dictated by logic alone.
The principal permutations of the Pennsylvania situations are as follows.
First with regard to mortgages executed before the Act.
1.

Where foreclosure proceedings were not had until after October 5th, 1936,31
it is reasonably clear that the effect will be just as though there had been no act
because the circumstances to be affected by the act arise for the first time when the
act is admittedly no longer effective32
II.

Where foreclosure proceedings were begun and the sheriff sale took place
before October 5th, but no appraisal was made at the request of the plaintiff mortgagee we have the exact case which the Supreme Court decided.
"Plaintiff failing to ask the court to determine the fair value
of the property and to fix the amount of the deficiency judgment, defendants, on December 12, 1934, petitioned that the judgment be
marked satisfied . . . . and the prothonolary thereupon entered satisfaction.- 3 3 (Italics supplied)
The case was heard on a petition and rule to strike off the satisfaction. The
doctrine of precedent or stare decisis would seem to control, i. e. the Court would
be asked to follow its own earlier decision unless conditions had so changed as to
make the rule unwise or inapplicable. At this writing the conditions have not
so changed.
Where foreclosure proceedings were begun and an appraisal was made at
either party's request before October 5th, the answer is not so clear. Most discus3

OThe lower court in the Shallcross case for example specifically stated the Act was constitu-

tional because it did not impair the obligations of contracts (24 D. & C. 496) about a year before
the Supreme Court found the Act unconstitutional.
Similarly Commercial Building Association
v. Steen et ux., 24 D. & C. 575 (1935).
31Date of Supreme Court decision in Beaver County case, supra.
22

Titus v. Poland Coal Co. 275 Pa. 431, 119 Atl. 540 is cited in the annotation on "Reliance
on Uncofstitutional Statutes" in 53 A.L.R. 273, as an example of the rule that reliance on a statute
after it is declared unconstitutional is no defense. It seems to the writer, however, that the reliance
in that case was before the declaration of unconstitutionality.
3
SQuoted from majority opinion in Beaver County case, supra.
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sion centers around this situation.
34
others:

It has suggested the following problems among

1.-Where a mortgagee has invoked the Act is he precluded from attacking
his deficiency judgment?
2.-Does a mortgagor who was ready, willing and able to bid at the sheriff's
sale have any rights by reason of the fact that he did not bid but relied on protection of the Act?
3.-Where deficiency judgments have been satisfied; are such satisfactions
automatically voided, are they not to be controverted, or may mortgagees file petitions to have such satisfactions stricken off?
4.-What is the effect on the rights of a bona fide purchaser of real estate
on which such a judgment has been satisfied?
Is a deficiency judgment entered after an appraisal has been made under
judicial auspices res adjudicala? If it is, the four questions just set down are all
answered at once.
Freeman says "though the enforcement or application of a legislative act
would seem to be predicated upon an assumption of its validity, yet, since courts
seldom undertake to pass upon the validity or constitutionality of legislation where
the issue is not raised by the parties, a judgment enforcing or applying such an act
is not res adjudicata of its constitutionality in a subsequent case between the same
parties in which this issue is made, but involving a different claim or cause of
action" 35 . (Italics supplied) Among other cases the author cites Philadelphia
v. Railway, a Pennsylvania case 36 . This is the key case of the present discussion and
merits careful consideration.
In 1872 our legislature passed an act which, inter alia, reduced the amount
of tax previously imposed by the charter of the Ridge Avenue Railway Qompany
of Philadelphia. An adjudication of the corporation's liability was made under
this act in 1883, 3 7 and taxes were paid accordingly during a considerable period.
Subsequently, in an independent suit 8 by the city to recover for paving Ridge
Avenue, the Supreme Court held the act unconstitutional. The City of Philadelphia immediately commenced action against the company to recover the difference
between the reduced taxes paid under the invalid statute, and the amount that
would have been due according to the original 1858 Charter, for the period from
1880 to 1888 inclusive. In the Common Pleas the City recovered. On appeal,
4

$ See Fiduciary Review for October, 1936.
352 Freeman on Judgments 711, p. 1501.
36
Philadelphia v. Ridge Avenue Railway, 142 Pa. 484, 21 At. 982 (1891).
3

7City of Phila. v. Ridge Ave. Railway Co., 102 Pa. 190.

S8Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia, 124 Pa. 219.
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it was held that the prior litigation determining the taxes for the years in question, though brought under the unconstitutional Act of 1872, was conclusive of
the cause of action there involved, that the judgment rendered in that suit was
res adjudicata, and the subsequent decision holding the act unconstitutional could
not alter the effect of such prior judgment. As our former Chief Justice puts it:
1 . . . . in short, the first suit had determined the whole liability as to the taxes which were then claimed, - the law and facts
in regard to that subject-matter had been settled once and for all,
however erroneous the view taken of the law might have been. This
case well shows the binding force in the field of law of the doctrine
under discussion when a particular cause of action, already reduced
to judgment, again comes before the courts in another suit between
the same parties."39
It should be noted that it is explicitly stated 40 that in the earlier decision in
102 Pa. 190 the constitutionality of the act of 1872 was not drawn in question.
Said the Court:41
"The argument of the company's counsel now is that, although,
in the case referred to, the point does not appear to have been made
or decided, yet the constitutionality of the act of 1872 must be taken
to have passed in rem judicatem; that the judgment in that case necessarily involved a decision that the statute imposing the tax was to
that extent valid, and, although the cause of action is not the same, the
city is estopped of record from re-litigating that question. In support
of this doctrine they cite Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall. 619; Aurora City
v. West, 7 Wall. 85; Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107; Corcoran
v. Canal Co., 94 U. S. 741; Wilson v. Deen, 121 U. S. 525; and
Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2 Smith Lead. Cas., 8th ed., 941.
"Whilst the general rule declared in these authorities is undoubtedly correct, it does not extend to estop a person from setting
up the unconstitutionality of a statute, when the cause of action is not
the same. The former judgment is absolutely conclusive upon the
parties, as to the cause of action involved in it, although the statute
upon which the proceedings were taken was not constitutional; that
judgment can only be impeached collaterally for fraud or want of
jurisdiction. Itis a matter of no consequence now that the act of 1872,
upon which judgment was entered for the amount of the tax, was unS9Von Moschizsker, "Res Judicata," 38 Yale Law Journal, 299, 30-302 (1929).
40Phila. v. Ry Co., supra. p. 493.
4l1bid.
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constitutionaland void; judgment having been entered, and no appeal
taken, the subject matter of the issue in that suit is res jidicata. The
former judgment, therefore, operates as a bar to any subsequeni action founded on the same demands; Bigelow on Estop., 80-88. In
the case at bar, however, whilst the point in issue may perhaps be the
same, the cause of action is different; and, although the verdict, with
the judgment thereon, would furnish conclusive evidence of the matters in controversy upon which the verdict was rendered, and operate
as a bar to the further litigation thereof, it would not preclude the
plaintiff in this suit from asserting the unconstitutionality of the act
upon which the previous action proceeded: Bigelow on Estop., 90103." (Italics supplied).
To clinch its reasoning the court appeals to equity as follows:
"Itis plain that if the parties had treated the act of 1872 as
unconstitutional, and the taxes had been paid and received pursuant
to the original charters, a subsequent adjudication that it was a valid
enactment would not entitle the company to receive back the excess,
and this is but the converse of the proposition now advanced by the
city. It is said to be a poor rule that will not work both ways. The
city cannot occupy inconsistent positions. Having chosen to treat
the act of 1872 as constitutional, and proceeded against and treated
with the company accordingly, she will not now be permitted to rip
up the annual settlements, made under it, to the prejudice of others'
rights."
The last language quoted is a supplemental reason for the decision and does
not weaken the case, 42 so far as it is an authority for the proposition that when
the Court has passed on transactions actively consummated according to a statute
they may not be opened when that act is declared unconstitutional.
Res adjudicata in the Federal and other state courts is relaxed in the constitutional field only when overwhelming considerations such as those raised by habeas
corpus proceedings demand it.43 Stepping outside of Pennsylvania for the moment, in election contest cases, 44 suits upon private bonds,*5 in actions on partnership accounts46 and in homestead decrees, 47 to take cases cited by Professor Field,
421n Borough of Allentown v. Saeger, supra, however, the fact that the government was a party
was given more weight than here.
4
3Field, Effect of An Unconstitutional Statute, p. 157.
44People ex. rel. McCarty v. Wilson, 6 Cal. App. 122, 91 Pac. 661 (1907).
5
4 Cassell v. Scott, 17 Ind. 514 (1861).
46Fuqua v. Mullen, 76 Ky. 467 (1877).
47Brandhoefer v. Bain, 45 Neb. 781, 64 N. W. 213 (1895).
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res adjudicata or the doctrine of preventing collateral attack has been applied to
deny attempts to evade or reopen judgments, even if they had been given uider
invalid statutes.
An Indiana case is particularly interesting.4 8 It was a suit to restrain the
collection of a judgment rendered on bonds filed with the county auditor under
an act regulating the sale of spirituous liquors. The plaintiff argued that since the
act under which the bonds were filed had subsequently been declared unconstitutional, and was therefore void, the judgment was a nullity. The Court held
that the judgment was erroneous-becausethe bonds were not supported by legal
consideration (owing to the unconstitutionality of the act),-but was not void,
and that it had to be regarded as operative until reversed by a court of error.
In Pennsylvania the appeal period of three months since the deficiency
judgment was entered will have passed in most cases.
Now consider a few cases which have been settled out of court or in court
on the assumption that the governing statutes were valid. They invoked more
elements of estoppel than of res adjudicata. Both federal and state courts have
denied bills of review in these cases.4 9 In a Pennsylvania case 50 an act of 1907
authorized boroughs to acquire waterworks owned by private persons and provided
a procedure for doing so. Appraisers were to be appointed to appraise the property and they were to file their report in the prothonotary's office. The report was
to be final if not appealed from in ten days after notice of filing. The owner of
the plant was required in due time after the value was fixed to elect to sell at
that valuation. In default of consent the company lost its exclusive privilege of
supplying the community with water, and the community could install its own
plant.
Here the matter proceeded to an appraisers' hearing when the company allcged the act was unconstitutional; which the boro denied. Subsequently the company filed a paper declining to sell at any price and admitting default under the
act. This disclaimer was filed of record. Then the company sought to enjoin the
borough from erecting a plant alleging unconstitutionality of the act. The borough contended that the company was estopped and was upheld by the courts below and above. The upper court quoted the lower court as follows."
"The plaintiff in this case (the water company) contends that
the waiver amounted to nothing, that the act cf 1907 is unconstitutional, and of no effect. I do not take that view of the matter.
Granted that the act of 1907 may be unconstitutional, it is neverthe48

Cassell v. Scott, supra.
Hoffman et al v. Knox et a!, 50 Fed. 484, C.C.A. 4 (1892); Harrigan v. County of Peoria,
262 J11. 36, 104 N.E. 172 (1914).
6OWater Co., v. Catasaqua Boro, 231 Pa. 290 (1911).
611bid, p. 294.
49
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less true that the company, in order to get rid of the suit, agreed
upon a basis of settlement. They admit certain rights as residing in
the borough. Why should it not be bound by its admission? The
borough relying upon it spent money ...
.....
'He who seeks
equity, must do equity'." The plaintiff cannot blow hot and cold
The upper court continues,
"In 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2nd ed.) 446, it is said: 'It
has been laid down as a general proposition, that where a party assumes a position in a legal proceeding and succeeds in maintaining
that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have
changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in, the position formerly taken
by him'."
The Court, after quoting the Bidwell case, makes the following significant
sfatement,
"The decree dismissing the application (for a court decree to
build) as well as the action of the borough in proceeding to erect the
plant were based upon the disclaimer or waiver filed by the water
company. It was filed of record, and prevented any further prosecution of the borough's application under the act of 1907, and defeated
the borough in having its right to erect a water plant adjudicated by
the court. (Italics supplied).
"There is no merit in the contention that the water company is
relieved from the effect of its disclaimer because the act of 1907 may
be unconstitutional. If it be conceded that the act does offend the
constitution, the proceedings and decree in the case remain unimpeached and cannot be attacked collaterally: Ferson's Appeal, 96 Pa.
140; Bidwell v. Pittsburg, 85 Pa. 412; Northampton County v. Herman, 119 Pa. 373. The validity of the estoppel does not depend upon
the constitutionality of the statute."
A New York case52 presents an excellent example of payment under a mistake as to the constitutionality of a statute, although unfortunately the opinion is
not reported in full. A bond and mortgage were executed in 1860. In 1870
mortgagor and mortgagee entered into a contract by which it was agreed the former should pay the principal and interest in legal tender and further should execute a satisfaction-piece covering the difference between the amount due in legal
52Doll v. Earle, 59 N. Y. 638 (1874).
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tender, and that due in gold, and deposit that sum in escrow. The parties further
determined to submit the question of what amount should be paid to the court,
delaying the same until the United States Supreme Court should decide the legal
tender cases. The agreement was carried out except as to submission. After the
Supreme Court of the United States had held the legal tender act void as to contracts executed prior to its passage the mortgagor paid the money in escrow. Now
he seeks to recover the money paid, but,
"Held that the payment was made voluntarily on a claim of right
under no mistake of fact and could not be recovered back; although
by the subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court (Knox
v. Lee, 12 Wall., 457), it appeared the payment was made under a
mistake of law."
It would thus appear that for reasons of estoppel, res adjudicata, mistake of
law, equity or a combination of all, where appraisals were made and deficiency
judgments were marked satisfied, in the absence of fraud or inadvertence, the
"mistake" of law does not preclude the validity of an actual satisfaction.
It perhaps remains necessary to further differentiate the second and third situations in order to allay a feeling that the recent decisions will control both.
Where no petition for appraisal has been filed by either party and - rare
situation-no satisfaction has been entered, clearly there is no res adjudicata. The
Court has not passed on the deficiency judgment question directly or indirectly,
according to the Act or aside from the Act. The original judgment stands except as estoppel may interfere. But where, as in the Beaver Counly case, satisfaction has been entered by the prothonotary, at the order of the defendant, the
question becomes somewhat difficult. The motion of the defendant must bear the
written approval of a judge of the court out of which the execution issued.58 Is
this written approval an adjudication of the right of the defendant to a default
satisfaction?
While a matter need not be litigated in order to be adjudicated, 54 no phase
of the question of deficiency judgment or that of satisfying the full judgment has
been argued before the court. We have a default satisfaction of a default judgment. At best the res adjudicata argument is not strong here.
The estoppel argument is likewise subject to serious weakness. The question is whether the defendant's failing to avail himself of his right to bid at the
sheriff's sale will now estop the plaintiff from vacating the satisfaction and recovcring the full judgment. Apparently the answer is that there is no estoppel, since
SSec. 8 of 1935 Act. That an order of the Court was not necessary, see Stetler et al v. Cohen
et al, 23 D.& C. 420 (1935).
5
4Hey v. Hillegas et a], 275 Pa. 497 (1923); Long v. Lebanon Nat'l Bank, 211 Pa. 165
(1905) ; Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. Ry., supra.
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the defendant did not suffer by not bidding if laches does not
to raise the question of fair value in equity. In his concurring
Justice suggests that, aside from the Act, the mortgagor could
lief in the lower court by filing a petition to have the sale

precludc his right
opinion the Chief
have obtained reset aside,

"for gross inadequacy in price such as would in law amount
to a fraud on the debtor's right. While mere inadequacy in price
where there is competitive bidding would not be sufficient to cause
the court to act . . . gross inadequacy amounting to a legal
fraud would be sufficient. Upon such a petition the evidence would
disclose the true value of the property and the court could order a resale, fixing, if necessary, an upset price. This practice has been frequently followed in equity, and as the court below is administering
equitable principles through common law forms there would seem
to be no reason why counsel should not have availed himself of this
procedure. It would require quite a stretch of the imagination to
contend that $900 the proceeds of the sale of a property worth
$14,000 was not grossly inadequate, and because of stringent economic conditions, a fraud on the debtor's right."
It is the writer's opinion that in this situation the plaintiff has a right to
reinstate his judgment because the matter has not been adjudicated and there is no
estoppel. He has several appropriate remedies other than that used in the Beaver
County case. 55 While the right is limited, 5 6 the plaintiff would have to satisfy
only the discretion of the court. But in the third situation the magic line seems to
have been crossed and res adjudicata and estoppel join against opening the judgment regardless of whether or not it has been satisfied.

6Thc usual remedy is a motion in the original action for an order cancelling the entry or return
of satisfaction and directing execution to issue for so much of the judgment as remains unpaid.
Hottenstein v. Haverly, 185 Pa. 305. Or he may use a rule to show cause. Pette's] Appeal, 126
Pa. 420 and Beaver County case, supra. However, by laches or failure to disavow an unauthorized
entry a party may ratify or estop himself to deny authority for the entry. Miller v. Preston. 154 Pa. 65.
5The court is not bound to set aside on motion a satisfaction voluntarily entered though without consideration. An entry of satisfaction willnot be vacated to the injury of innocent third
persons who have acted on the strength of the record, as in the case of a bona fide purchaser of
property who became such when the judgment appeared by the record to be satisfied. Freeman on
Judgments 1166, p. 2410 citing McCune v. McCune, 164 Pa. 611; Parsons v. Shaeffer, 65 Cal. 79;
Van Sickle v. Harmeyer, 172 Ill. App. 218.
There is no question regarding the bona fide purchaser of the land executed upon since he
is protected by his sheriff's deed: Loram v. Mayneo, 22 D. & C. 216 (1934); Menges v. Dentler,

33 Pa. 495 (1859).
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Let us now turn briefly and in conclusion, to questions arising where mortgages were executed after the passage of the Act. 57 In these cases, at least wherc
there was no express provision excluding it, the Act became a part of the contract.
The situation is reversed and it is the recent decision of the court which itself impairs the obligation of contracts. This sort of impairment is condoned by both
state and federal courts, 58 however.
One Pennsylvania case,5 9 without having the exact problem before it, contains some interesting dicta on the matter. The plaintiff leased gas lands to the
defendant with the express understanding that the plaintiff was to remain in possession. If the defendant did not drill wells he was to pay a certain sum monthly
to plaintiff and plaintiff had option to terminate the lease. At the time the agreement was drawn, Pennsylvania law had provided for seveny-three years that nonperformance of any covenant by the party of the second part where there was a
condition and forfeiture clause ipso faclo ended the contract so no action could be
brought by lessor against lessee. Subsequent to the date of the agreement the
earlier cases were overruled, and the plaintiff brought an action for the monthly
sums. The defense was impairment of the obligations of contract. In upholding
the plaintiff the court said by way of dictum:
"The courts of highest authority of all the states, and of the
United States, are not infrequently constrained to change their rulings
upon questions of the highest importance. In so doing, the doctrine
is, not that the law is changed, but that the court was mistaken in its
former decision, and that the law is, and really always was, as it is
expounded in the later decisions upon the subject. The members of
the judiciary in no proper sense can be said to make or change the law;
they simply expound and apply it to individual cases. To this general
doctrine there is a well-established exception, as follows: - 'After a
statute has been settled by judicial construction, the construction becomes so far as contract rights are concerned as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a change of decision is to all intents and purposes the same in effect on contracts as an amendment of the law by
means of a legislative enactment'; Douglass v. Pike Co. 101 U. S.677.
See, also, Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S.361, and cases there cited;
Cooley, Const. Lim., 474-477. To this effect, and no more, we under7

6 The present consideration is likely to be purely academic since it concerns only mortgages
executed after January, 1934 and foreclosures before October 5, 1936. And it is based on the very
large assumption that the Act is unconstitutional even where it does not impair the obligation of
contracts.
58
Ray v. Natural Gas Co., 138 Pa. 576 (1890); Gilpeke v. Dubuque, I Wall. 175, 17 L. Ed
520 (U. S. 1864).
59
Ray v. Pittsburgh, supra.
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stand to be the cases of Ohio Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 432; Gclpeke v. Dubuque, I Wall. 175; Havemeyer v. Iowa Co., 3 Wall. 294;
Olcott v. Supervisor, 16 Wall. 678. In Ohio Trust Co. v. Debolt, supra,
the doctrine is thus stated: 'The sound and true rule is that if a contract,
when made, was valid by the laws of the state, as then expounded by all
the departments of the government and administered in its courts of justice, its validity and obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent act
of the legislature, or the decision of its courts altering the construction
of the law.' The ruling applies, it will be observed, not to the general law, common to all the states, but to the laws of the state, 'as expounded by all the departments of its government;' and it is held
that contracts valid by these laws may not be impaired, 'either by subsequent legislation, or by the decisions of its courts altering their construction .' The reference is of course to the statute law."
While we are all presumed to know the law, those of us who are members
of the bar recognize the fact that we do not know what the courts will decide the
law to be. It is this anomoly plus the well-known doctrine that equity particularly
regards the circumstances of each case which prevent categorical conclusions in a
discussion of this sort. But we may be confident that wherever possible our courts
will apply the maxim:
"Interest reipublicai ut sit finis litium."
Philadelphia, Pa.

F. C. Fiechter, Jr.

